Author: Encrypted Skanda, Source: Author Twitter @thecryptoskanda

The Crypto audience is the most learning and gambling crowd in the world. Their good bets differ from classic "casino gamblers" in that they do not require fixed odds and believe in information gap advantages rather than long-trained skills (out of thousands) or the law of large numbers. Therefore, they don't like to do dojos in snail shells, and repeatedly study how to beat the 0.5% house edge of blackjack dealers; instead, they look for the alpha hidden in the new target and exit before the market understands.

They need targets that are not widely known, so traditional markets and mainstream currencies do not meet the requirements, and the cost of seeking "new" is a low-liquidity, high-risk target market:

1. High transaction efficiency (whether it can be traded quickly); 2. High volatility (small transaction volume leads to large fluctuations and rapid rise); 3. The advantages of non-trading mechanisms are minimized (you can gamble and lose but not be rugged). Such a target is in line with their needs for early discovery, precise exit, and ability to exit.

Similarly, the dealer will make trade-offs in three dimensions, but the purpose is to maximize the comprehensive profit ROI, no matter in what way: fairness (whether there is a non-trading advantage); transaction efficiency (whether the two parties can quickly trade); volatility (Whether it can be traded at a low cost), unless it is a philanthropist, from the perspective of a banker. These three dimensions are the impossible triangle. The bookmaker will consider how to balance player orientation and maximize ROI when designing.

Whether it is the electronic disk of the post card in the early days, or the AMM mechanism of the digital currency, the meme coin, the NFT pending order transaction, or even the BRC20/ETHS fair inscription pending order, and the Friend curve, they are essentially the same thing. Different ratios, but to attract users, you need to have: wealth effect (exponential ROI of flagship projects); sufficient target (latecomers have more projects to rush); somatosensory customer loss is controllable.

Let's compare non-free mint PFP NFT, BRC-20 and Shuizang from Zhuang's point of view:

**BRC-20 is the least economical, **the banker has no advantage, and the transaction efficiency of the pending order mode is low. The advantage is that it does not require too much money to pull the market when the initial emotional side is there, but the premise is that the banker hits the full amount of inscriptions.

NFT≈BRC-20, the project party has a greater advantage, it can be reserved for smashing and rug.

Shu Zang is completely black box, there is almost no open market available, and it is basically a game between Zhuang and leisure.

If it is substituted into the GGR killing rate model, we find that: The data killing rate is the most controllable, followed by NFT, and BRC-20 is completely uncontrollable.

What would you do if you were Zhuang? This is why iBox has reached a height that the NFT market has so far been difficult to achieve. Similarly, the BRC-20 project has no successors and its life cycle is much shorter than that of NFT, which is not surprising regardless of cultural attributes. "Fairness" can bring temporary popularity and wealth effects, but in the end it is the operator's needs that determine everything.

So how about comparing @Friendtech, Shuizang and NFT?

We will find that NFT is more cruel, because the user’s opponent is always the platform, and the automatic market-making algorithm is used for transactions. The algorithm is positively related to the number of net purchases, and the only cost is 5% to KOL.

For the same pull, FT actually needs to pay 5% of the current price, while NFT needs to pay 100% of the floor price of the market circulation in full.

Even in the price drop range, if support is needed, then FT is still equivalent to continuous LBP issuance, while NFT can only continue to hard sell with sales revenue + royalties. Imagine that FriendTech has not announced a referendum plan. Is it possible to only reward buying and punish selling?

Speaking of this, I have to mention what is wrong with another plate @blur_io made by Paradigm. It is obviously also a trading mining code washing model.

The problem is that Blur's subsidies go to the wrong people. Blur let its users go to the gambling table to do bid wall and provide liquidity to whom? To the holder of the blue chip NFT.

The holder is dumped on the user, resulting in losses. Who took this customer loss? It is a holder. Blur didn't get anything, but instead sent airdrops to users based on the trading volume. This is like a gambler who gets 1.2% for washing his code, and loses 80% of the bet for the code. And the casino didn't make a dime.

What is the correct way to do this? Blur only allows its own NFT targets to participate in transaction mining, and bid wall as counterparty, customer losses become Blur’s GGR, use part of the pull, and at the same time use transaction mining to subsidize user buying behavior, and finally control the kill rate at within a certain range. In the next step, continue to absorb excellent NFT teams, join transaction mining under the premise of using Blur as a market maker, become Curve of NFT, and even rule NFT.

In fact, seeing this, I believe the answer is already coming out: find a target with (actual) low fairness, high volatility, and as high transaction efficiency as possible; establish a trading platform with a transaction mining subsidy mechanism; subsidize purchase behavior through the transaction mining mechanism , the subsidy fully controls the target; ensure that the total customer loss is slightly higher than the total subsidy (including the cost of pulling the bid); package the mining mechanism and market-making terms, expand the screening area of the project side, and make active bids.

Of course, I only substituted the perspective of the dealer, Paradigm's POV. In fact, most of us are 10,000 @Delphi_Digital from Paradigm

(The ability to mobilize the big V of the whole network is not something that can be learned)

It is difficult to say how the market responds, whether the right time, place and people are in place. But with the Ordinal jewels ahead, the Bot line came from behind, Why Not?

There must be a next (group) hero on the chain

IT COULD BE YOU。